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 Abstract 
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), government-owned or managed investment vehicles, have 
proliferated at a remarkable rate over the past decade, even as political controversy has 
surrounded them.  Why?  The extant literature depicts the process of SWF creation as driven 
by functional imperatives associated with “excess” revenue and reserves accumulated from 
commodity booms and large current account surpluses. I argue that SWF creation also 
reflects in large part a process of contingent emulation in which first this policy has been 
constructed as appropriate for countries with given characteristics, and then when countries 
took on these characteristics, they followed their peers. Put simply, fashions and fads in 
finance matter for policy diffusion. I assess this argument using a new dataset on SWF 
creation that covers nearly 80 countries from 1984 to 2007. The results suggest peer-based 
contingent emulation has been a crucial factor shaping the decision of many countries to 
create a SWF, especially among fuel exporters.   
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I.  Introduction 
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), government-managed or owned investment vehicles, are 
growing rapidly in number and size, particularly in emerging market and developing 
countries. This growth highlights two significant tensions in contemporary international 
economic relations. First, the growth of SWFs as important investors implies a redistribution 
of financial wealth and geopolitical clout away from the West to new emerging powers.   
Understandably, this redistribution has left some in the West uncomfortable. Second, the 
growth of public sector actors operating in private financial markets has generated significant 
normative tensions. By blurring the line between finance and politics and states and markets, 
the expansion of SWFs potentially introduces a framework for state-market relationships that 
is at odds with the private-sector, commercial-oriented framework with which most 
established powers, particularly the United States, are comfortable.    
Sovereign wealth funds have proliferated at a remarkable rate over the past decade, even as 
controversy has surrounded them. Not surprisingly, they have attracted a great deal of 
attention. The primary focus of the existing literature, written largely by economists, 
policymakers, and market participants, has been on the economic causes and 
consequences of SWFs (Aizenman and Glick 2008; Gieve 2008; Jen 2007; Kern 2008; 
Lyons 2007; Merrill Lynch 2008). To the extent political scientists have explored SWFs, their 
focus has been largely on the national security implications of potentially politically driven 
investment vehicle (Drezner 2008; Kirshner 2009). What we lack is systematic knowledge 
about how political motivations may shape the decision to create a SWF.   
Much of the literature, even that in international political economy (IPE), assumes that SWF 
creation is largely a functional response to the accumulation of “excess” revenue and 
reserves from recent commodity price booms, particularly for oil, and large and protracted 
current account surpluses, most notably in East Asian economies. I argue otherwise. The 
remarkable rate at which SWFs have been created has not been simply nor largely a 
functional response to macroeconomic determinants. In fact, much of it, I contend, has been 
driven by forces exogenous to countries that lie in the peer groups or networks in which they 
are situated. Put simply, “fashions” and “fads” have been an important factor shaping the 
creation of SWFs. More specifically, I argue that rise of SWFs has been linked to their 
diffusion as a socially constructed appropriate institutional form or policy for particular 
countries to emulate. The decision of many governments to create a SWF have been 
shaped by a process of contingent emulation in which first this policy has been constructed 
as appropriate for countries with given characteristics, and then when countries took on 
these characterized, they followed their peers.      
The cognitive process of peer-based emulation is partly based on inductive reasoning in 
which countries surmise that what “works” for other members of a peer group will also “work” 
8 — Chwieroth / Fashions and Fads in Finance — I H S  
 
for them, even though such reasoning is not based on conclusive evidence.  Peer-based 
emulation is also based on a desire to develop symbols that signal conformity with a peer-
group’s standards of behaviour as well as a desire to maintain or enhance esteem, pride, 
prestige, and status. It is thus deeply rooted in processes of identity formation and socially 
constructed standards of behaviour.   
In contrast to learning, when countries emulate the policies of others they do so without 
reflection on the evidence of the efficacy of that policy.  Empirically, I find this pattern of peer-
based contingent emulation to be particularly prominent among fuel exporters. In confronting 
the challenges, complexity, and uncertainty of specializing in fuel exports, policymakers 
turned to socially constructed “fashions” and “fads” among their peer group of fuel exporters 
to provide an important base of decision-making. When it became “fashionable” for fuel 
exporters to create a SWF, those countries that specialized in fuel exports became more 
likely to create one.   
This paper is organized as follows. The first section offers a primer on the rise of SWFs.   
The second section then outlines the process of contingent emulation and other various 
mechanisms of diffusion and links them to SWF creation. The third section discusses the 
method and a new dataset on SWF creation that covers nearly 80 countries from 1984 to 
2007 that are used to assess the argument. The fourth section discusses the results. To 
preview the findings, the data are consistent with the argument that peer-based contingent 
emulation has been a crucial factor shaping the decision of many countries to create a SWF, 
especially fuel exporters. The results are robust to the inclusion of variables capturing other 
notable processes of diffusion such as competition and learning as well as widely-cited 
macroeconomic determinants. What is perhaps most noteworthy is the finding that the 
magnitude of the effect of peer-based contingent emulation is much larger than that for 
functional imperatives from fuel export specialization alone. The data also reveal to an extent 
that less democratic regimes and poor institutional quality are also weakly associated with 
SWF creation. The fifth section concludes the paper.  
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II.  A Primer on the Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Sovereign wealth funds are government-managed or owned investment vehicles that use 
national savings to acquire international assets. These national savings are typically 
established out of balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the 
proceeds of privatization, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts from commodity exports. While 
there is no universally shared definition of what constitutes a SWF, most observers agree 
that they share three common traits: (1) government ownership; (2) investment strategies 
that include the acquisition of international assets; and (3) no significant explicit short-term 
liabilities.1    
Sovereign wealth funds have become an important class of investors in terms of the size of 
assets under their management. In March 2010 SWF assets under management were 
estimated to have grown to $3.8 trillion (Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute 2010). Most 
forecasts predict SWF assets to reach at least $10 trillion over the next five years (Merrill 
Lynch 2008; Kern 2008; Lyons 2007; Jen 2007). While these holdings are much less than 
assets under management by mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, and 
central banks, they amount to considerably more than those under management by hedge 
funds and private equity groups.    
Sovereign wealth funds generally fall into one of three categories according to the primary 
sources of their foreign exchange assets. Some SWFs receive their primary funding from 
commodity sources, largely oil, gas, and mineral related revenues generated from state-
owned firms or taxes. Other SWFs receive their primary funding from reserves transferred 
from the central bank. Recent estimates suggest that funds derived from oil and gas export 
revenues account for some two thirds of total assets under SWF management, with the 
remainder consisting of assets mainly controlled by East Asian countries that have 
accumulated large stockpiles of reserves from large and protracted balance of payments 
surpluses (Aizenman and Glick 2008:2). A much smaller group of SWFs receive their primary 
funding from budgetary surpluses, proceeds from privatization or transfers from the 
government’s main budget 
Sovereign wealth funds are not a recent innovation – Kuwait created the first such modern 
entity, the Kuwait Investment Authority, in 1953.  Three years later a SWF was created is 
what is now Kiribati. A few additional SWFs were created in the 1970s (Abu Dhabi, 
Singapore), 1980s (Brunei, Oman, a second one in Singapore) and early 1990s (Botswana, 
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Norway).   
                                                     
1 This definition thus excludes those funds that solely invest in domestic assets as well as government-employee 
pension funds, social security funds, government lending funds, and government-owned banks and enterprises.  It 
does, however, include pension reserve funds, which do not have explicit pension liabilities. 
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Beginning in the late 1990s the rate at which governments created SWFs increased 
remarkably. Figure 1, which uses data taken from Truman (2008), shows the cumulative 
number of SWFs created from 1946 to 2008.2 Two dozen SWFs have been created since 
2000, bringing the total in 2008 to above 40. The year 2009 witnessed the creation of eleven 
new SWFs and four new funds have been announced in 2010 (Monk 2010).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 graphs the number of SWFs in 2008 by region. Reflecting their primary sources of 
funding in oil and gas related revenues and balance of payments surpluses, Figure 2 shows 
a significant concentration of SWFs in the Middle East and Asia. This is followed by a 
modest presence in Africa, Latin America, and the former Soviet Union. There is only one 
SWF located in Europe (Norway) and none located in North America (though there are four 
sub-national SWFs in Alaska, Alberta, New Mexico, and Wyoming). 
 
 
                                                     
2 In contrast to Truman (2008), given the focus on cross-country differences in SWF creation, I exclude sub-national 
SWFs, such as the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund and the Alaska Permanent Fund.   But, like Truman, I make 
exceptions for the United Arab Emirates and Hong Kong.    
I H S — Chwieroth / Fashions and Fads in Finance — 11 
 
Figure 2: Sovereign Wealth Funds by Region (2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given their primary sources of funding, most observers have drawn a strong link between 
the recent remarkable rate of SWF creation and the commodity price boom, particularly for 
oil, and global imbalances that began in the early 1990s. There has been a threefold 
increase in reserves over the past decade, with much of it concentrated among oil exporters 
and East Asian economies (IMF 2010).  For commodity exporters, SWFs may offer a way to 
insulate the budget and the economy against price swings (a “stabilization” objective).    
SWFs may also offer a way to convert non-renewable assets into a more diversified portfolio 
of assets for future generations and to mitigate the effects of Dutch disease (a “savings” 
objective).  In fact, many of the early SWFs were created with precisely these objectives in 
mind.  
As the reserves of many economies reached levels deemed adequate for precautionary 
reasons, policymakers searched for a way to manage these “excess” reserves. For 
economies with an “excess” of reserves, SWFs may offer a way to raise the rate of return on 
a government’s foreign exchange holdings (a “reserve investment” objective) beyond that 
traditionally received from holding low-yielding US Treasury debt or its equivalent. Finally, for 
some, SWFs may offer a way to use “excess” revenues and reserves to fund socio-
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economic projects or promote industrial policies that might raise output or aid in the 
internationalization of domestic firms (a “development” objective). It should also be noted 
that the objectives of a SWF may be multiple, overlapping, and changing, and that some 
countries, such China, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates, have more than one SWF 
(see Table 2).   
In addition to different objectives, SWFs are a heterogeneous group in terms of their internal 
governance and their size. Funds differ significantly in terms of the legal frameworks, their 
linkages to macroeconomic policy, funding and withdrawal rules, as well as their risk 
appetites, level of transparency, and risk management frameworks (Truman 2008). It is the 
opacity of SWFs, most pronounced among fuel exporters, that has raised much of the 
concern about the potential for politically motivated investment decisions. Perhaps most 
notably, SWFs differ in terms of their size, ranging from $300 million in the case of Mauritania 
to $627 billion for the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) (Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Institute 2010). In addition to ADIA, eight other SWFs hold assets over $100 billion: Norway 
($443 billion), Saudi Arabia ($415 billion), China (two funds; one with $347.1 billion, the other 
with $288.8 billion), Singapore (two funds; one with $247.5 billion, the other with $133 
billion), Hong Kong ($227.6 billion), Kuwait ($202.8 billion), and Russia ($142.5 billion). 
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III. Diffusion Mechanisms 
The extant literature assumes SWF creation to be a functional response to “excess” revenue 
and reserves linked to commodity price booms and large and protracted balance of 
payments surpluses. I argue, however, that SWF creation is also linked to its diffusion as an 
appropriate institutional form or policy for particular countries to emulate.3 More specifically, 
the decision of many countries to create a SWF was shaped by a process of contingent 
emulation in which first this policy was constructed as appropriate for countries with given 
countries, and then when countries took on these characteristics, they followed their peers.      
Emulation is a model of diffusion where actors model their behaviour on the socially 
constructed legitimate examples provided by others. This mechanism of diffusion is often 
associated with organizational sociology (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Meyer and Rowan 
1977; Meyer et al. 1997) and constructivism (Finnemore 1996; Abdelal et al. 2010). The 
causal processes of emulation involve actors operating under bounded rationality and/or 
uncertainty. Bounded rationality means that actors cannot possibly collect and process all 
available information that might bear on a particular set of beliefs. In a related fashion, 
constrained by uncertainty, even the most rational of actors cannot find conclusive evidence 
to support the efficacy of a particular policy. Actors therefore rely on shortcuts to gather, 
process, and interpret the world. Social constructs such as theory, rhetoric, norms, values, 
and meaning thus serve as the basis for action; and this basis for action often comes from 
cues taken from peer-based reference groups. 
Emulation takes place through a process of inductive reasoning where actors adopt the 
practices pursued by their peers in part because they view them as more or less similar.  
Emulation is thus based on the logic of appropriateness and deeply rooted in processes of 
identity formation and understanding. States adopt policies pursued by their peers partly for 
reasons related to their identities as members of that peer group. 
Some governments may emulate their peers because they reason that the policies of peers 
fitting a set of characteristics will also “work” for them, even though this conclusion is based 
on inductive reasoning rather than conclusive evidence.  Indeed, peer-based emulation 
implies that the creation of a SWF would be a function of governments acting out of a desire 
to conform to standards of behaviour constructed by actors in a reference group with which 
they identify, regardless of any performance-based metric. Governments may conform in to 
develop symbols, or what Axelrod (1986:1105) calls “social proof,” that they belong to a 
particular group. Governments may also emulate valued peer groups because of reasons 
related to esteem, pride, prestige, and status (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:903-904).    
Thus, the desire to enhance or defend one’s esteem, pride, prestige or status via a particular 
peer group can explain following particular standards of behaviour. Emulation does not entail 
                                                     
3 For a framework conceptualizing different diffusion mechanisms, see Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett (2008).   
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any reflection on information about the efficacy of a policy; as such, some refer to this 
mechanism as “symbolic imitation” (Weyland 2004).   
Unlike organizational sociologists, who have concentrated on ritualistic adoption of standards 
from an increasingly global culture or “world polity,” I argue that emulation reflects a 
contingent process in which first a particular policy is constructed as appropriate for 
countries with given characteristics, and then when a country fits those characteristics, it will 
follow others that fit the prescription. Governments are thus unlikely to create a SWF until 
they have fit certain characteristics.       
Countries often look to their structural equivalents to as a key reference group. Countries 
may seek to emulate their equivalents in international trade such as those with similar export 
product profiles. This, however, complicates efforts to disentangle the influence of emulation 
from competition in any empirical analysis (see below).  In addition to export product profiles, 
other reference groups may have been influential for the decision to create a SWF.    
“Reserve accumulators,” for instance, may seek to emulate the policies of other “reserve 
accumulators.” When a critical number of “reserve accumulators” create SWFs, other 
countries, when they reach a particular concentration in fuel exports, may follow other 
“reserve accumulators” in creating a SWF.  A similar dynamic may have motivated the 
decision to create a SWF for countries specializing in fuel exporters and those specializing in 
ores and minerals exports. The decision may have been motivated by esteem, pride, 
prestige, or status or by a belief that creating a SWF will also “work” for them managing 
“excess” revenue and reserves. Evidence for such proposition would suggest that processes 
of social construction had been at work for defining appropriate behaviour for the identity 
called “reserve accumulators,” “fuel exporters” or “ores and minerals exporters.” 
Peer-based emulation implies that countries will influence each other more when they are 
engaged in close interaction or proximity, or when they share characteristics. Put simply, 
when a particular policy becomes “fashionable” among a relevant peer group, countries 
within that peer group are more likely to adopt it. In emulating others countries adopt their 
policies without reflection on evidence of their efficacy, rather they may surmise based on 
inductive reasoning that the policies of their peers will also “work” for them.    
Emulation implies that some countries may have created SWFs without reflecting on the 
evidence of whether such a policy choice fit their particular functional need. Indeed, a 
number of observers have referred to SWFs as the new “fashion” (Cohen 2009:714) or “fad” 
(Warde 2009:20) in international finance, but none has empirically assessed the possibility 
that emulation may have driven the decision of some governments to create them.  There 
are several reasons to suggest why this may be a reasonable approximation of the cognitive 
processes underpinning the decision to create some SWFs. 
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First, it should be noted that setting up a SWF is not the only way for countries to manage 
their “excess” revenues and reserves. Governments may also use their foreign exchange 
assets to reduce or match external debt obligations, as Mexico did in 2004 and 2005 (Das et 
al. 2009). Although this policy may be an equally efficacious way to manage “excess” 
revenues and reserves, governments may have been less inclined to pursue it because it 
was less “fashionable.”  
Second, and more importantly, the opaqueness of most SWFs meant that governments 
considering setting up a SWF had little way of accessing detailed evidence as to whether 
other they were meeting their objectives in terms of “reserve investment,” “stabilization,” and 
so on.  Indeed, the vast majority of SWFs fail to disclose detailed information on their assets, 
investment portfolios, governance structures, and performance (Truman 2008).  
Governments would have been able to observe other structurally equivalent countries 
creating SWFs, but they would have found it difficult to “learn” whether creating a SWF was 
an efficacious policy.    
Learning closely resembles emulation. Learning refers to a change in beliefs, or a change in 
the strength of one’s confidence in existing beliefs, in light of acquisition of new information.  
Governments learn by acquiring new information from the experience of others and updating 
their prior beliefs in a Bayesian fashion. Yet the pure Bayesian approach is often said to be 
too demanding in terms of the information requirements for decision-making. Because actors 
cannot possibly collect all available information that might bear on a policy choice, many 
learning models typically argue that the process of updating beliefs takes place in a bounded 
rather than fully rational fashion. Rather than search for all available information, 
governments search for relevant information from select sources (Weyland 2004; 2005).    
Actors therefore rely on various shortcuts to gather and process information.  Sociologists 
and constructivists see learning as being channelled, with some sources being more relevant 
than others. To the extent learning is channelled, it is likely to occur along existing 
communication networks. In such models, the cognitive process of actors is shaped by an 
“availability heuristic” in which actors are drawn to those experiences that are most available 
to them (Weyland 2004; 2005; Meseguer 2005). However, to the extent that fully rational 
learners give greater weight to results where there is less noise (variability in the results), the 
use of select sources such as existing communication networks (where there may be less 
noise) would also be consistent with the pure Bayesian model (Meseguer 2006).   
Learning thus involves new information about the success or failure of policy change in other 
countries influencing the probability of policy change in the country under investigation.   
Learning may be fully rational as in the pure Bayesian model; or it may be bounded or 
channelled. But what all models of learning share, and what distinguishes them from 
emulation, is reflection on causal pathways leading from policies to outcomes.  Learning thus 
entails some connection to a reasonable measure of performance. Empirically, there would 
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be good reasons to suppose learning is occurring if we observed the creation of a SWF in a 
particular country following highly successful performance in countries where SWFs are in 
operation. 
Competition is another important mechanism of diffusion. Competition models have focused 
largely on how rivalry among governments for capital and market share has resulted in the 
diffusion of liberal economic policies. According to this view, governments have a strong 
incentive to adopt policies that make their economies an attractive place for investors or that 
make their products and firms more competitive in global markets. For instance, in a series 
of papers, Simmons and Elkins show how competitive dynamics have led governments to 
liberalize their capital accounts, current accounts, and exchange rate regimes as well as 
create bilateral investment treaties (Simmons and Elkins 2004; Elkins, Guzman, and 
Simmons 2008).  
Much of the competition model literature assumes that rivalry induces governments toward 
market-friendly policies. Rarely is consideration given to the possibility that competition could 
drive countries toward more statist forms of economic management.  While the convergence 
literature has explored the possibilities for activist economic management, scholars have yet 
to devote much attention to the rise of policies and associated with “state capitalism.” 
Instead, the defining feature of much of the diffusion literature has been its narrow focus on 
the spread of economic liberalism.      
Competition models are also usually silent about the deeper beliefs that presumably give rise 
to the perception that liberalization abroad should be with similar measures at home 
(Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2008:23). Pressure from policy rivalry alone is represented 
as sufficient to induce convergence toward market-friendly policies. Missing from these 
accounts is attention to the deeper constitutive questions as to how governments come to 
believe in the first place that liberalization is desirable.     
Such questions have been the focus of constructivists (Abdelal et al. 2010) and 
organizational sociologists (Lee and Strang 2008) who show that much of what diffuses 
depends on the constitutive norms that prevail within the world economy in a given time 
period. These constitutive norms define the boundaries of choice and affect how 
governments react to competitive pressures. The importance of such norms often make a 
cameo appearance in the work of competition models (see, for instance, Simmons and 
Elkins 2004:173-174), but rarely are these norms investigated systematically.    
Incentives give rise to particular courses of action because of the meaning that action has to 
the actors themselves, and this meaning is in turn a function of constitutive norms. If a 
competitor liberalizes capital controls, this may induce others to follow suit if constitutive 
norms in one time period define such policy as desirable, but the same action may have little 
or no effect in a different time period where alternative norms prevail. In terms of 
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understanding SWF creation, this line of argument suggests the growing attractiveness of 
state capitalism over the past decade may have shaped the manner in which governments 
reacted to SWF creation in policy rivals. In the absence of such beliefs, it would be difficult to 
understand how governments came to believe in the first place of the desirability of creating 
a SWF.   
The rise of SWFs has been associated with growing recognition of the state as a normatively 
appropriate actor in the world economy. The 1990s was a decade when the Washington 
Consensus and free-market oriented norms – macroeconomic stabilization, liberalization, 
privatization, and deregulation – were triumphant. Yet a decade of market reforms failed to 
meet many of the expectations of officials and citizens in emerging markets and developing 
countries. It became clear to many, particularly after the uneven economic performance of 
many Latin American economies and the wave of financial crises in emerging markets in the 
late 1990s, that a rethink was necessary.  Among many in the West, the new emphasis was 
to supplement market reforms with a focus on institutional development (North 1990; Singh 
et al 2005).     
Yet among many emerging market and developing countries the diagnosis was not to 
supplement free market policies with stronger institutions, but to minimize their vulnerability 
to free markets through greater state interventionism. The shift for many emerging markets 
and developing countries was not particularly difficult. When many liberalized in the 1990s, 
they did so only partially and often grudgingly.  Despite measures to liberalize the economy, 
a history of state involvement left legacies of state-owned enterprises, most notably in the 
banking, energy, utilities, infrastructure, and corporate insurance industries, and privately-
owned national champions in many emerging markets and developing countries (Kurtz and 
Brooks 2008; Weiss 2003; Underhill and Zhang 2005). Following the demise of the 
Washington Consensus, new theories in development economics lent increasing legitimacy 
to greater interventionism, particularly the use of industrial policy (Rodrik 2004). China’s 
record of spectacular growth also heightened the appeal of state capitalism (Halper 2010).    
Empirically, competition models of diffusion typically rely on indicators that seek to capture 
rivalry among similar actors who want access to some third party or market.  Since 
governments create SWFs to export rather than attract investment, it is unlikely that 
competition for capital has been an important influence. Competitive trade pressures among 
countries exporting to the same market (“market competition”) or among countries exporting 
similar products (“role competition”), however, may have been an important motivation for 
creating SWFs.  As suggested, some SWFs have a “development objective” to support the 
internationalization and competitiveness of domestic firms. Brazil’s SWF was created in 2009 
partly with this objective in mind.   
Diffusion studies also often examine a fourth diffusion mechanism, coercion, where powerful 
external actors impose their policies on others. However, it seems unlikely to have played an 
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important role in the decision to create a SWF. Indeed, rather than being endorsed, SWFs 
have caused much anxiety and concern among many powerful developed countries, 
particularly in the West (Cohen 2009).   
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IV. Method and Data 
This investigation uses an event history model to estimate the duration of time before a 
country creates a SWF. I estimate this model with a Cox proportional hazard model, a useful 
estimator that does not make strong assumptions about the effect of time on the baseline 
propensity to experience an event (i.e. create a SWF). I calculate the spatial and peer effects 
(see below) using data from 1948 to 2007 across a sample of 182 countries.  However, data 
limitations, particularly those on macroeconomic determinants, limit the event history 
analysis to data from 1984 to 2007 across a sample of 104 countries. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the creation of a SWF where a value of 1 captures the occurrence 
of the event and 0 otherwise. Table 1 summarizes the data on SWF creation, taken from 
Truman (2008), including fund name and date of establishment. 
Table 1:  Sovereign Wealth Funds  
Country Current Name 
Year 
Established 
Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund 2000 
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan 1999 
Botswana Pula Fund 1993 
Brunei Darussalam Brunei Investment Agency 1983 
Chile Economic and Stabilization Fund 2006 
China China Investment Corporation 2007 
 Shanghai Financial Holdings 2007 
Gabon Fund for Future Generations 1998 
Hong Kong Exchange Fund Investment Portfolio 1993 
Iran Oil Stabilization Fund 2000 
Kazakhstan National Fund for the Republic of Kazakhstan 2000 
Kiribati Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund 1956 
Korea Korea Investment Corporation 2005 
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority 1953 
Libya Libyan Investment Authority 2006 
Malaysia Khazanah Nasional 1993 
Mexico  Oil Income Stabilization Fund 2000 
Nigeria Excess Crude Account 2003 
Norway Government Pension Fund - Global 1990 
Oman State General Reserve Fund 1980 
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority 2005 
Russia National Welfare Fund 2008 
 Reserve Fund 2008 
São Tomé and Principe National Oil Account 2004 
Saudi Arabia  Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 1952 
 
Singapore 
Government of Singapore Investment 
Corporation 1981 
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Country Current Name 
Year 
Established 
 Temasek Holdings 1974 
Sudan Oil Revenue Stabilization Account 2002 
Timor-Leste  Petroleum Fund 2005 
Trinidad and Tobago Heritage and Stabilization Fund 2007 
United Arab Emirates Emirates Investment Authority 2007 
United Arab Emirates (Abu 
Dhabi) Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and Council 1976 
 International Petroleum Investment Company 1984 
 Mubadala Development Company 2002 
United Arab Emirates (Dubai) DFIC Investments 2006 
 Dubai Investment Capital 2004 
 Investment Corporation of Dubai 2006 
 Istithmar World 2003 
Venezuela Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund 1998 
 National Development Fund 2005 
 
Diffusion Effects 
Countries with excess reserves or countries that can significantly expand reserves through 
high levels of fuel or mineral and ore exports may be prone to create a SWF.  The creation of 
a SWF is not the only way to manage excess reserves, however (Das et al. 2009).    
Creating a SWF may not necessarily be a functional response to having significant reserves 
or specific export profiles. It may depend on the behaviour of other countries with similar 
characteristics.   
To study contingent emulation, I develop a number of individual peer effects that builds on 
Strang and Tuman (1993).  For a given country i in year T its generic peer effect is: 
∑ ∑
≠ ≠
=
iz iz
tztit zSWFZPit /(  
where Zit is a binary variable equal to 1 when country i meets a particular set of 
characteristics at time T and 0 otherwise. SWFzt is the number of SWFs that have been 
created by countries with the particular set of characteristics z at time T and zt is the total 
number of countries that share the particular set of characteristics at time T. Thus, if “fuel 
exporters” seek to emulate the behaviour of other “fuel exporters,” then this measure seeks 
to tap into that process by representing the ratio of SWFs created by “fuel exporters.”  The 
process is “contingent” because governments seek to emulate the behaviour of “fuel 
exporters” only once they meet the characteristics that define a “fuel exporters;” hence the Zit 
binary variable. 
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I develop two peer effects to assess contingent emulation based on different reserve 
accumulation thresholds. International best practice for reserve management provides two 
general rules of thumb for assessing reserve adequacy for precautionary reasons: (a) 
reserves should be more than or equal to three months of imports; and / or  (b) reserves 
should be more than or equal to short-term external debt.4 I therefore use these rules of 
thumb to set the thresholds for fitting the characteristics of a “reserve accumulator.”  I also 
create similar thresholds and ratios for countries with a high level of fuel exports and for 
countries with a high level of mineral and ore exports; in particular whether a quarter of their 
exports are composed of such products. 
I develop a similar measure to capture learning. Following Simmons and Elkins (2004), I 
assume that governments are likely to draw lessons for policymaking from those countries 
that are perceived to be successful.  While there are many measures of success, I opt for the 
most visible and well-publicized metric: growth rates. I then calculate the ratio of SWFs 
among the top growth decile. The higher this ratio, the greater the likelihood that 
governments will conclude there is evidence that creating a SWF enhances economic 
performance.  Like the contingent emulation peer effects, this measure assumes that only 
governments that qualify as “reserve accumulators” or “fuel exporters” or “minerals and ores 
exporters” will be motivated to learn about the efficacy of SWFs.  Note that policymaker use 
of the top growth decile alone to update beliefs about the efficacy of SWF creation may be a 
short-cut (i.e. bounded learning) or it may reflect giving greater weight to results where the 
noise (variability) of  results is less (i.e. rational learning).5 It may also reflect “follow the 
leader” emulation.6 
The effects of various other diffusion mechanisms are represented using a series of monadic 
spatial effects that build on the method discussed in Neumayer and Plümper (2010).   
Monadic spatial effects aim to assess how one unit’s choice is influenced by the choices of 
other units given that the level of influence varies depending on the “proximity” of the units.     
When using time-series cross-sectional data, the traditional spatial effect modelling for this 
process for a country i is given as: 
SE i,t= ∑
k
tktik YW ,,  
where Wik is an Ni by Nk by T spatial weighting matrix measuring the proximity between 
countries i and k at time T..  The closer country i is to country k at time T the more likely the 
creation of a SWF in k will influence i to do the same.   
                                                     
4 Other factors, such as large current account deficits, overvalued exchange rates, and weak banking systems, 
would suggest a need for even higher levels of reserves for precautionary purposes.   
5 On the substantive similarity of bounded and rational learning in such circumstances, see Meseguer 2006.   
6 On “follow the leader” emulation, see Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett (2008:34-35).   
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In the traditional model, the dependent variable Y, and therefore the spatial effect, is coded 
as 1 in the year that this policy is implemented, 0 in all proceeding years.  Substantively, this 
would imply that the effect of creating a SWF is felt only in the year of creation, but that it 
fails to be influential thereafter. This modelling does not fit with the theory outlined, which 
suggests that policy choices continue to be influential in years following their creation. I 
therefore modify the traditional model so that it employs cumulative spatial effects. Instead of 
Y dichotomous variables I use the cumulative number of SWFs country k is observed to 
have created between 1948 and a given year T. The modified cumulative spatial effect thus 
becomes: 
SE i,t= ∑
k
tktik CW ,,  
where Wik is an Ni by Nk by T spatial weighting matrix measuring the proximity between 
countries i and k at time T and Ck,t is the cumulative number of SWFs that country k has 
created up until and including time T.   For example, Singapore has created two SWFs; one 
in 1974, another in 1981.   Its cumulative C from 1974 to 1981 was 1 and 2 from 1981 until 
the end of the observation period in 2008.  While not a true spatial lag, these monadic 
cumulative spatial effects better capture policy influences between countries over time.   
To assess competitive processes of diffusion, I create two measures of “competitive 
distance” that follow from Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons (2008). One measures the degree 
to which governments compete in the same foreign markets. “Export market similarity” is 
constructed using the IMF Direction of Trade data to produce an N by N by T matrix of 
correlations (between countries) across the countries’ proportion of exports to each trading 
partner. In theory, this distance varies from -1 to 1, with countries that export goods in the 
same proportions to foreign markets scoring the latter; while those with the opposite 
relationship scoring the former.    
Another measure of competitive distance captures the degree to which countries export the 
same basket of goods. “Export product similarity” is constructed using information from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators that describes a country’s export profile. I 
calculate the correlation between countries for each year across over a dozen such 
indicators.7 In theory, this distance varies from -1 to 1, indicating the similarity between 
country export profiles.  In addition to capturing “role competition,” this measure of export 
product similarity also taps into processes of “role emulation.”  I also develop a spatial effect 
to measure the influence of peer-based emulation based on a country’s trading partners.  
The data are from Simmons and Elkins (2004) and supplemented by the IMF’s Direction of 
Trade database. 
                                                     
7 I use the following variables to capture export product similarity: agricultural raw materials, arms, communications, 
food, fuel, high-technology, insurance and financial services, international tourism, manufactures, ores and metals, 
other commercial services, transport services, and travel services.   
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Macroeconomic and Political Determinants  
I also control for various macroeconomic and political determinants. It is widely presumed 
that the creation of a SWF is a functional response to reserve accumulation, commodity 
price cycles, and large and protracted current accounts surpluses. I therefore include five-
year moving averages of the current account balance as a proportion of GDP, fuel exports as 
a proportion of exports, ores and minerals exports as a proportion of exports, reserves as a 
proportion of months of total imports, and reserves as a proportion of short-term debt.  These 
data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.      
The literature on SWF creation has thus far devoted little attention to theorizing the domestic 
political determinants of SWF creation; let alone empirically testing for their impact.  Yet it 
seems sensible to suppose that such factors may be influential.   In less democratic or poorly 
governed countries, SWFs may resemble other state-owned enterprises in often being used 
as a private good to provide a relatively unscrutinized, off-budget source of resources that 
may be used to cultivate political support. As the “resource-curse” literature suggests, 
opportunities for such rent-seeking behaviour are likely to be particularly strong in economies 
endowed with natural resources (Karl 1997; Ross 1999). Such rentier states are typically 
characterized by the relative absence of domestic taxation, as their resource wealth 
precludes the need extract income from their citizenry. This lack of a fiscal connection 
between the government and its citizenry in turn retards political development and may lead 
to efforts to limit the transparency of state-owned enterprises so as to prevent citizens from 
potentially posing a threat to the benefits that rent-seekers enjoy. This line of argument is 
consistent with the finding that SWFs in fuel-exporting economies tend to be the least 
transparent (Aizenman and Glick 2008). To the extent governments use SWFs as private 
goods, they should be associated with less democratic and weak institutions. 
In more democratic or strongly governed countries, SWFs may resemble public goods by 
helping to provide the benefits of stabilization, savings, reserve investment, or development 
for all citizens to enjoy. Indeed, not all resource-rich countries have suffered from the 
resource curse. Countries that seem to avoid the resource curse – including Norway and 
Botswana (both of whom have SWFs) – had democratic regimes and strong institutions 
when they discovered their natural resource wealth (Mehlum et al. 2006).  Not surprisingly, in 
more democratic and better governed countries, SWFs tend to exhibit greater transparency 
(Aizenman and Glick 2008).   
In line with these arguments, I assess the influence of two domestic political determinants: 
democracy and institutional quality. Data on democracy are taken from Polity IV with the 
scale ranging from -10 (the least democratic) to +10 (the most democratic).8 Data on 
institutional quality are taken from the Political Risk Service’s International Country Risk 
                                                     
8 http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
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Guide.9 I use the composite measure “political risk,” which contains twelve components 
capturing government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, 
external conflict, corruption, military in politics, religious tensions, law and order, ethnic 
tensions, democratic accountability, and bureaucracy quality. The composite measure runs 
from zero to 100, with higher values indicating poorer institutional quality.  
                                                     
9 http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx 
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V. Results and Discussion 
Table 2 presents the results in the form of hazard ratios. A hazard ratio greater than 1 
represents a positive effect on the odds of creating a SWF; less than 1, a negative effect.  
Networks of ties between countries tend to overlap. Moreover, many of the spatial and peer 
effects are highly correlated with the macroeconomic determinants on which they are based.  
Multicollinearity thus presents a significant challenge.10 A common procedure in event history 
analysis is to sequentially add variables to the model to assess the stability of the parameter 
estimates and hence to ensure the harmful effect of multicollinearity is minimized. In ancillary 
analysis, I assessed the impact of different correlation cut-offs and settled on .30 as an 
appropriate benchmark for generating stable parameter estimates.11 In a few instances, 
judgement was called for in overlooking this benchmark so as to permit the assessment of a 
fuller range of diffusion processes.12   
                                                     
10 Multicollinearity creates unreliable parameter estimates (i.e. the magnitude of the coefficient is inflated or deflated 
and/or the sign varies) and inflates the standard errors. 
11 Results are available from the author upon request. 
12 This occurred most often in the case of “export market similarity” and “export product similarity” which tended to 
have moderately strong correlations (.3 to .44) with some of the peer effects.  Multicollinearity issues also ruled out 
controlling for the influence of peer-based emulation based on common religion, language, and colonial power.   
None of these alternative measures of peer-based emulation was significant in ancillary analysis.   
26 — Chwieroth / Fashions and Fads in Finance — I H S  
 
Table 2: Effects on Creation of Sovereign Wealth Fund, 1984 - 2007     
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Current Account Balance / GDP 1.13** 1.02 1.02 1.01 .998 1.04 1.02 1.02 .992 
 
(.064) (.063) (.060) (.062) (.059) (.139) (.135) (.119) (.115) 
Fuel Exports / Exports 1.04** 
        
 
(.013) 
        Ores and Minerals Exports / Exports 1.02 
        
 
(.024) 
        Reserves / Months of Imports 1.13 
  
1.05 1.09 
  
.982 1.06 
 
(.141) 
  
(.149) (.168) 
  
(.129) (.143) 
Reserves / Short-term Debt .794 1.00 1.00 
  
1.00 1.00 
  
 
(.134) (.002) (.002) 
  
(.003) (.003) 
  Democracy .923 .917 .921 .917 .921 .908 .914 .903* .917* 
 
(.066) (.056) (.055) (.054) (.051) (.058) (.062) (.054) (.048) 
National Governance Quality 1.10 1.06* 1.07** 1.07* 1.07** 1.04 1.05 1.03 1.04 
 
(.075) (.035) (.033) (.035) (.034) (.039) (.037) (.038) (.039) 
Policies of Reserves Accumalators (Imports) 
 
.977 .978 
      
  
(.032) (.038) 
      Policies of Reserve Accumulators (Short-term Debt) 
   
.989 .988 
    
    
(.091) (.095) 
    Policies of Fuel Exporters 
 
1.05** 1.06** 1.06** 1.06** 
    
  
(.019) (.027) (.019) (.026) 
    Policies of Ore and Mineral Exporters 
 
1.06 1.09* 1.05 1.08 
    
  
(.070) (.054) (.062) (.053) 
    Policies of Trade Partners 
 
1.04 1.04 1.04 1.03 
    
  
(.032) (.032) (.035) (.035) 
    Policies of Export Product Competitors 
  
1.01 
 
1.03 
 
1.13 
 
1.15 
   
(.154) 
 
(.143) 
 
(.121) 
 
(.094) 
Policies of Export Market Competitors 
 
.809 
 
.804 
 
.641 
 
.662 
 
  
(.200) 
 
(.179) 
 
(.204) 
 
(.188) 
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Policies of High-Growth Countries - Reserves Accumalators   
(Imports) 
 
.977 .979 
  
.976 .991 
  
  
(.032) (.038) 
  
(.042) (.056) 
  Policies of High-Growth Countries - Reserve Accumulators  
(Short-term Debt) 
  
.988 .989 
  
1.04 1.04 
    
(.091) (.095) 
  
(.038) (.040) 
Policies of High-Growth Countries - Fuel Exporters 
     
1.15 1.14 1.16* 1.14* 
      
(.113) (.098) (.102) (.089) 
Policies of High-Growth Countries - Ores and Minerals Exporters 
     
.996 1.01 .998 1.01 
      
(.082) (.077) (.082) (.069) 
Number of Subjects 79 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 
Number of Failures 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Observations 1365 1157 1164 1177 1184 1157 1164 1177 1185 
Log Likelihood -27.69 -26.84 -26.96 -27.14 -27.26 -29.89 
-
30.34 -30.08 -30.41 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5% 
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Column 1 presents results from the baseline model for all countries, which includes the 
macroeconomic and political determinants outlined above. The coefficients on current 
account balance and fuel exports are in the expected direction and significant. Figures 3 and 
4 illustrate the effect of these variables of the probability of creating a SWF by plotting 
survival curves for different levels of current account balances and concentrations of fuel 
exports.  Figure 3 compares the survival rates for governments facing current account 
balances at the mean and one and two standard deviations above the mean.  Figure 4 
compares the probability of creating a SWF for a government largely dependent on fuel 
exports (50% of exports) versus one without fuel exports. In both figures all other variables 
are held at their mean.   
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The effects, while significant, are not particularly strong. In both cases slightly less than 1% 
of governments with large current account surpluses or fuel export economies would have 
created a SWF by 2007.  Functional imperatives may have shaped the decision to create a 
SWF, but not in a substantively significant way. Remarkably, measures of reserve 
accumulation have no significant impact on the probability of creating a SWF.13    
Columns 2 - 9 add the diffusion mechanisms. Several clear empirical patterns begin to 
emerge. There is very consistent and convincing evidence of the importance of contingent 
emulation among fuel exporters in explaining the creation of SWFs. In each model 
specification, there is highly suggestive evidence that when countries reach a particular 
threshold of concentration in fuel exports, they emulate what other fuel exporters do.14     
 
                                                     
13 There is no change in these results in ancillary analysis where for the five-year moving averages I substitute 
dummy variables indicating whether a country had surpassed precautionary thresholds for reserve accumulation.   
14 Like all the peer and base effects, the peer effect for fuel exporters and the five-year moving average are highly 
correlated (.77).  Despite their covariance, the rate of change for each variable is vastly different, with the peer effect 
showing a much faster rate of increase over time.   This provides at least the basis for the peer effect to be logically 
identifiable, which is made apparent in Figures 4 and 5.   
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Figure 5 illustrates the influence of the fuel exporter peer effect on the probability of creating 
a SWF by plotting survival curves for two conditions: one in which the cumulative ratio of 
SWFs among fuel exporters is set to .001 and another in which it is set to 50. The lower 
value was selected for two reasons. First, because the peer effect takes on an observed 
value of zero only for economies not specializing in fuel exporters, this specification enables 
a comparison of the influence of the peer effect among fuel exporters. Second, by setting the 
lower value close to zero, it provides a basis for teasing out the peer effect from the effect of 
specializing in fuel exports alone. Since the cumulative ratio of SWFs among fuel exporters 
is near the lower bound of the measure, the curve largely captures functional imperatives for 
economies specializing in fuel exports.   
The effect of contingent emulation is much greater in magnitude than the effect essentially 
capturing the functional imperatives facing fuel exporters. Almost 50% of those fuel exporters 
with a substantial cumulative ratio of SWFs among their peers would have created one as 
well by the start of the new millennium, while less than 5% of those essentially without peers 
with SWFs would have created one by that time.  These results provide strong preliminary 
evidence that contingent emulation is central to the spread of SWFs among fuel exporters.   
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Figure 6 compares the smoothed hazard rate for an economy specializing in fuel exporters 
facing varying cumulative ratios of SWFs among its peers.  The hazard rate denotes the rate 
of SWF creation per time unit conditional on not having a SWF at or beyond time T.  It 
suggests that the influence of the peer effect on the rate of SWF creation does become 
particularly large until the cumulative ratio begins to approach 40. This provides highly 
suggestive evidence that at this threshold, processes of social construction work to define 
creating a SWF as appropriate behaviour for the identity called “fuel exporters.” 
In addition to the peer effect among fuel exporters, results from one model (column 3) 
suggest that contingent emulation may have been shaped the decision of ores and minerals 
exporters as well.  However, the evidence is not overwhelming (p < .10). The hypothesis that 
successful performance attracts adherents is only weakly supported by these results.  In two 
models (columns 8 and 9), there is weak evidence (p < .10) of a tendency of fuel exporters 
to follow the policies taken by countries in the fastest-growing decile. One possibility is that 
decisions of fuel exporters are driven partly by a process of updating beliefs about the 
efficacy of creating a SWF. Another possibility is that these results reflect a process of 
contingent emulation in which fuel exporters are simply “following the leader.”    
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Figure 6. Conditional SWF Creation Rate for Fuel Exporters: Policies of Fuel Exporters
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Measures of trade competition generally add little to understanding SWF creation. The 
market similarity variable had no effect, while export product similarity variable was attained 
a weak level of significant (p < .10) in only one model (column 9). Overall, there is little 
compelling evidence that competition alone affects the decision to create a SWF.  
The measures for democracy and institutional quality fare somewhat better, but yield no 
definitive conclusions. Poor institutional quality is consistently signed to increase the 
likelihood of SWF creation, but it fails to attain statistical significance in models where the 
effect of the policies of high-growth countries is considered. The effect of less democratic 
institutions is also consistently signed to increase the likelihood of SWF creation, but it 
manages to achieve only a weak level of significance (p <  .10) in two models (columns 8 
and 9). There is thus some evidence to suggest associated less democratic and poor 
institutional quality with SWF creation, but it is not particularly robust.   
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VI. Conclusion 
The number of SWFs has grown significantly over the previous decade. Their growth has 
been a remarkable illustration of changes to both the distribution of financial power and 
geopolitical clout between the West and emerging powers and to the distribution of ideas 
about states and markets. How can we understand the rise of what some (Farrell et al. 2007) 
are calling important “new power brokers” in world economy? 
The evidence this paper provides suggests that observers may have overestimated the 
importance of functional imperatives associated with the accumulation of “excess” revenue 
and reserves from recent commodity price booms and large and protracted current account 
surpluses. There is little doubt that multiple motives exist for the creation of SWFs, but 
functional imperatives alone do not provide an adequate account of the reasons that 
countries have created SWFs. A fuller understanding requires being attentive to forces 
exogenous to countries that lie in the peer groups or networks in which they are situated. 
Peer-based contingent emulation rests on strong theoretical foundations and finds consistent 
support from the data. When more SWFs are created among fuel exporters, countries that 
specialize in fuel exports are more likely to follow suit. The robustness of this finding across 
multiple model specifications provides strong initial evidence of a tendency of countries to 
match the policy choices of their peer groups or networks. Given the alternatives available 
for countries with “excess” revenue and revenues and the difficulty policymakers face in 
accessing detailed evidence on the performance of other SWFs, emulation is arguably a 
reasonable approximation of the cognitive processes captured by the data.    
In dealing with the challenges, complexity, and uncertainty of specializing in fuel exporters, 
policymakers were likely motivated to search for an appropriate means to manage “excess” 
revenue and reserves. Yet the opacity of most SWFs means that policymakers would have 
encountered great difficulty in finding incontrovertible evidence of their efficacy. The 
“fashions” and “fads” of other fuel exporters therefore served as an important base of 
decision-making. The microfoundations of such emulation are based inductive reasoning 
(“what ‘works’ for other fuel exporters will ‘work’ for our country too”), social proofing, 
symbolic imitation, esteem, pride, prestige, and status. As the results here suggest, the 
influence of such motivations, and “fashions” and “fads” more generally, may provide far 
more explanatory power for understanding policy choices than much of the literature in 
international political economy has allowed.15 Indeed, the evidence provided here suggests 
that processes of social construction have been at work for defining appropriate behaviour 
for the identity “fuel exporters” and possibly others.     
                                                     
15 Emulation and the motivations for it has been a primary focus for organizational sociologists, but, with the notable 
exception of Simmons and Elkins (2004), few scholars of international political economy have systematically 
examined its influence on policy choices.    
34 — Chwieroth / Fashions and Fads in Finance — I H S  
 
VII. References 
Abdelal, Rawi, Mark Blyth, and Craig Parsons, eds.  2010. Constructing the International 
Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).   
Aizenman, Joshua and Reuven Glick.  2008.  Sovereign Wealth Funds: Stylized Facts about 
their Determinants and Governance, NBER Working Paper 14562 (Cambridge: 
NBER). 
Axelrod, Robert.  1986.  An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, American Political Science 
Review 80 (4):1095-1111. 
Cohen, Benjamin J.  2009.  Sovereign Wealth Funds and National Security: The Great 
Tradeoff, International Affairs 85 (4):713-731. 
Das, Udaibir S., Yinqiu Lu, Christian Mulder, and Amadou Sy.  2009.  Setting up a Sovereign 
Wealth Fund: Some Policy and Operational Considerations.  IMF Working Paper  
WP/09/179 (Washington, DC: IMF).  
DiMaggio, Paul J, and Walter W. Powell.  1991.   The New Institutionalism in Organizational 
Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).   
Drezner, Daniel W.  2008. Sovereign Wealth Funds and the (In)security of Global Finance, 
Journal of International Affairs, 62, no. 1, pp. 115-130. 
Elkins, Zachary, Andrew Guzman, and Beth A. Simmons.  2008. Competing for Capital: The 
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, in Beth A. Simmons, Frank 
Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett, eds., The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy, 
220-260 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).   
Farrell, Diana, Susan Lund, Eva Gerlemann, and Peter Seeburger.  2007. The New Power 
Brokers: How Oil, Asia, Hedge Funds, and Private Equity are Shaping Global 
Markets (San Francisco: McKinsey Global Institute).  
Finnemore, Martha. 1996. National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press).  
Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink.  1998.  International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change, International Organization 52 (4):887-917. 
Gieve, John. 2008. Sovereign Wealth Funds and Global Imbalances, Speech to the 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Management Conference, London, March 14. 
Halper, Stefan. 2010. The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model will 
Dominate the Twenty-First Century (New York: Basic Books).  
International Monetary Fund.  2010. Reserve Accumulation and International Monetary 
Stability (Washington, DC: IMF).   
Jen, Stephen.  2007.  Currencies:  How Big Could Sovereign Wealth Funds be by 2015?  
(New York: Morgan Stanley Research Group).  
Karl, Terry Lynn.  1997.  The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley: 
University of California Press).  
I H S — Chwieroth / Fashions and Fads in Finance — 35 
Kern, Steffen.  2008.  SWFs and Foreign Investment Policies – An Update (Frankfurt: 
Deutsche Bank Research).  
Kirshner, Jonathan.  2009.  Sovereign Wealth Funds and National Security: The Dog that 
Will Refuse to Bark, Geopolitics, 14, no. 2, pp. 305-316. 
Kurtz, Marcus J. and Sarah M. Brooks.  2008.  Embedding Neoliberal Reform in Latin 
America, World Politics 60 (2):231-280. 
Lee, Chang Kil and David Strang.  2008.  The International Diffusion of Public Sector 
Downsizing: Network Emulation and Theory-Driven Learning, in Beth A. Simmons, 
Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett, eds., The Global Diffusion of Markets and 
Democracy, 141-172 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).   
Lyons, Gerard.  2007. State Capitalism: The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds (London: 
Standard Chartered).   
Mehlum, Halvor, Karl Moene, and Ragnar Torvik.  2006. Institutions and the Resource Curse, 
Economic Journal 116: 1-20.   
Merrill Lynch.  2008.  Sovereign Wealth Funds: One Year On (New York: Merrill Lynch Global 
Economics Team).  
Meseguer, Covadonga.  2005.  Policy Learning, Policy Diffusion, and the Making of a New 
Order, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 598:67-
82. 
Meseguer, Covadonga.  2006.  Rational Learning and Bounded Learning in the Diffusion of 
Policy Innovations, Rationality and Society 18 (1):35-66.  
Meyer, John W., John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez.  1997.  World 
Society and the Nation-State, American Journal of Sociology 103 (1):144-181. 
Meyer, John W., and Brian Rowan.  1977.  Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure 
as Myth and Ceremony, American Journal of Sociology 83:340-363.  
Monk, Ashby H.B.  2010.  Sovereignty in the Era of Global Capitalism: The Rise of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds and the Power of Finance, Unpublished manuscript, University of 
Oxford.   
Neuymayer Eric, and Thomas Plümper.  2010.   Spatial Effects in Dyadic Data, International 
Organization 64: 145-166. 
North, Douglas C.  1990.  Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).   
Rodrik, Dani.  2004.  Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First Century, Centre for Economic 
Policy Research Discussion Paper DP4767 (London: CEPR). 
Ross, Michael L.  1999.  The Political Economy of the Resource Curse, World Politics 51 (2): 
297-322. 
Simmons, Beth A., Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett.  2008.  Introduction: The Diffusion of 
Liberalism, in Beth A. Simmons, Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett, eds., The 
Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy, 1-63 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press).   
36 — Chwieroth / Fashions and Fads in Finance — I H S  
 
Simmons, Beth A., and Zachary Elkins.  2004.  The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy 
Diffusion in the International Political Economy, American Political Science Review 
98 (1):171-189. 
Singh, Anoop, Agnes Belaisch, Charles Collyns, Paula De Masi, Reva Krieger, Guy 
Meredith, and Robert Rennhack   2005.  Stabilization and Reform in Latin America: A 
Macroeconomic Perspective of the Experience since the 1990s (Washington, DC: 
IMF).   
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute.  2010.  Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings, Available at 
http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/ (Accessed 2 August 2010).  
Strang, David and Tuma, N.B.  1993.  Spatial and Temporal Heterogeneity in Diffusion, 
American Journal of Sociology 99 (3):615-639. 
Truman, Edwin M.  2008.  A Blueprint for Sovereign Wealth Fund Practices, Peterson 
Institute for International Economics Policy Brief PB08-3 (Washington, DC: Peterson 
Institute for International Economics). 
Underhill, Geoffrey R.D., and Xiaoke Zhang.  2005.  The Changing State-Market 
Condominium in East Asia: Rethinking the Political Underpinnings of Development, 
New Political Economy 10 (1):3-26.  
Warde, Ibrahim A.  2009.  Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Politics of Boom and Bust, in 
Sven Behrendt and Bassma Kodmani, eds., Managing Arab Sovereign Wealth in 
Turbulent Times – and Beyond, 20-27, Carnegie Papers Number 16 (Beirut: 
Carnegie Middle East Center). 
Weiss, Linda.  2003.  Guiding Globalisation in East Asia: New Roles for Old Developmental 
States, in Richard Robison, Mark Beeson, Kanishka Jayasuriya, and Hyuk-Rae Kim, 
eds, Politics and Markets in the Wake of the Asian Crisis, 53-74 (London: 
Routledge).   
Weyland, Kurt, ed.  2004.  Learning from Foreign Models in Latin America Policy Reform.   
(Washignton, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center).   
Weyland, Kurt.  2005.  Theories of Policy Diffusion: Lessons from Latin American Pension 
Reform, World Politics 57 (2):262-295. 
 
 
 
  
  
 
Authors: Jeffrey Chwieroth 
 
Title: Fashions and Fads in Finance: Contingent Emulation and the Political Economy of Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Creation 
 
Reihe Politikwissenschaft / Political Science Series 131 
 
Editor: Prof. Johannes Pollak, IHS 
Associate Editor: Sarah Christian, IHS 
 
ISSN: 1605-8003 
© 2012 by the Department of Political Science, Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), 
Stumpergasse 56, A-1060 Vienna •  +43 1 59991-0 • Fax +43 1 59991-555 • http://www.ihs.ac.at  
 
 
 ISSN: 1605-8003 
 
